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America continues to recover from its most recent 
recession, and the impact on social problems will 
reverberate for years. In one respect, though, it 
appears we can breathe easier: the crime wave that 
many thought to be inevitable did not occur. Crime 
has remained fairly stable and, in many states, has 
even declined since the start of the recession, a fact 
not entirely surprising among criminologists. While 
many people assume it is inevitable that crime rises 
when the economy is suffering, an examination of 
historical trends reveals this is not the case. While 
violent and property crime did increase during the 
Great Depression, throughout the remainder of the 
20
th
 century and into the 21
st
, the relationship 
between crime and the economy has been 
inconsistent. Deeper analysis reveals a complex 
relationship in which community-level variables 
may trump macro-level conditions, and different 
social policies may either push the crime rate up or 
help constrain it. Yet the criminal justice system 
suffered repercussions from the recession. The 
immediate future regarding how the current 
economic climate may affect correctional policy and 
practice is discussed in this article. These projections 
are discussed within the context of what history has 
revealed regarding crime rates, sentencing practices, 
and recidivism. Finally, some strategies for long-
term investments to reduce crime are presented. 
Over half of U.S. states had their corrections budgets 
reduced as a result of the fiscal crisis.
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 Christine S. Scott-Hayward, “The Fiscal Crisis in Corrections: 
fortunate we did not experience a jump in criminal 
activity that would have placed greater demands on 
the system, we are in hardly in a position in which 
we can ignore the problem. We cannot simply cap 
crime until the coffers are replenished. Correctional 
agencies strapped for cash are not able to turn away 
newly sentenced offenders. With little control over 
crime rates and sentencing practices, correctional 
systems must continue to accommodate new 
offenders, while simultaneously meeting the needs 
of existing populations in ways that do not 
compromise public safety.  
States have coped with a variety of adaptations. 
These include layoffs, hiring and wage freezes, 
cutting programs, eliminating or limiting non-
essential services, and—either through consolidating 
populations or early release mechanisms—closing 
institutions.
2
  The impact of these actions is diverse, 
diffuse, and not easily measured. A state-by-state 
comparison of corrections budget appropriations for 
the 2009-2010 fiscal year, determined when the 
recession was still underway, reflected some of the 
uncertainty regarding the immediate economic 
future. Missouri saw just a 1.48 percent reduction in 
its corrections budget during that fiscal period.
3
 
Seven of the states for which fiscal data were 
available that year experienced cuts in excess of 10 
percent, although the budgets in eleven states 
actually grew or remained stable. 
Missouri has adapted to these cuts while continuing 
to make significant investments in a platform of 
programs and partnerships designed to ensure 
successful reintegration of offenders. The 2010 fiscal 
year budget included an additional $3 million to be 
allocated towards a major reentry initiative, 
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supplementing grant funding the state had received.
4
  
This initiative is still underway, with the sixth round 
of funding, exceeding $1.8 million, awarded to 
selected community agencies in 2013.
5
 Increased 
program spending in the midst of a fiscal crisis is not 
as counter-intuitive as it may seem. Indeed, such 
initiatives, that have been termed “reinvestments of 
justice,” hold considerable promise for long-term 
cost-efficient measures to lessen crime.  
 
 
Factors influencing corrections growth  
and spending 
Predicting the future of corrections and project 
spending needs is fraught with challenges. Certainly, 
the demand for prison beds is largely impervious to 
the availability of funds. Corrections expansion and 
spending are inextricably tied to sentencing practice. 
Sentencing changes that result from legislation 
mandating prison terms have fairly predictable 
impacts. For example, the three-strikes-you’re-out 
and truth-in-sentencing statutes that became popular 
in the late 1980s and 1990s fueled the prison boom 
and resulting expenditures. (However, increasing the 
capacity to lock up criminals for longer periods has 
had mixed results, as discussed later in this article.)  
But broad trends are largely a product of 
discretionary practices, and these are notoriously 
difficult to predict. Sentencing has a great deal to do 
with how individual actors in the system behave. 
Prosecutors and judges are politically motivated and 
responsive to a variety of factors, both at the local 
level and in regard to individual cases. It can be 
argued that their behavior is, in large part, swayed by 
public perceptions about crime control. In light of 
the unpredictability of sentencing practices, 
projection of prison populations and budgetary needs 
is quite complicated. 
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 Of course, crime rates affect sentencing trends, and 
therefore should be predictive of corrections 
spending. But they are no longer as important as 
they once were. For most of the 20
th
 century, 
sentencing trends were a proximate reflection of 
changing crime rates; that is, we tended to 
incarcerate more offenders as crime rose and fewer 
when crime fell. But things changed when a crime 
wave broke out in the 1960s, gaining momentum in 
the late 1970s, continuing through the 1980s and 
early ’90s. In 1960, the violent crime rate in America 
was 160.9, by 1991 it peaked at 758.1 (the rate is 
computed per 100,000  people).
6
  It has further been 
observed that the “punishment index,” which is the 
probability an offender will be arrested combined 
with the length of time he will serve, declined in the 
late 1960s and ’70s.
7
 This suggests that crime was a 
consequence of a lax criminal justice system that 
was soft on crime. While criminologists do not 
discount this, they also offer a plethora of other 
explanations for the change in the rate. These 
include baby boom-induced changes in the age 
structure of the population, crumbling urban cores, 
and the illicit drug trade (particularly crack cocaine), 
among others. 
The precipitous increase in the crime rate led to a 
series of sentencing reforms designed to keep certain 
groups of offenders behind bars for longer periods. 
Prison populations skyrocketed in the 1980s and 
1990s, slowly stabilizing in the 2000s. From 1990-
2000, this country experienced an 81 percent 
increase in its incarceration capacity in state prisons, 
with the construction of 351 new adult facilities, an 
expansion reaching to over half a million new prison 
beds.
8
 Prior to the crime wave, the U.S. 
imprisonment rate had held steady for nearly a 
century. From 1880 to 1970, it hovered around 100-
200 persons per 100,000. The rate began to 
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accelerate quite dramatically by the 1980s, and the 
nationwide decline did not begin until 2009.
9
  On the 
face of it, then, the burgeoning prison populations of 
the late 20
th
 century reflected nothing more than a 
rational response to the climbing crime rates. Yet in 
the last decade and a half, the two trends began to 
diverge. The crime rate began to decline in the mid–
1990s, with the violent crime rate peaking at 758.1 
in 1991, and has more or less leveled off in the 21
st
 
century, with some minor year-to-year fluctuations. 
By the close of 2012, the violent crime rate was 
386.9.
10
   
Missouri’s incarceration trend has followed the 
national trend of lagging behind the crime trend. As 
crime slowed, we continued to lock up offenders in 
greater numbers, gradually stabilizing over a decade 
after crime began to fall. The state’s index crime 
rate
11
 fell 26 percent between 1992-2012, yet the 
prison population nearly doubled during this same 
timeframe, expanding from 16,181 state prisoners in 
1992 to 31,517 in 2012.
12
    Missouri was hardly 
unusual in this regard. While crime rates fell in 48 
states between 1998 and 2012, only nine of these 
experienced a decline in incarceration rates.
13
 
Fear equates to continued support for expansive use 
of incarceration. Fear of crime, which is largely 
attributable to excessive media attention to violent 
crimes, has not fallen commensurate with actual 
crime.
14
 Thus, while sentencing does not appear to 
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 “Nearly 4 in 10 Americans Still Fear Walking Alone at 
Night,” Gallup, accessed May 15, 2011, 
be entirely independent of crime rates, the trend is 
not wholly rational and is a function of not simply 
actual crime rates, but perceptions of these.  
The high price of the incarceration boom is reflected 
in the quadrupling of state corrections budgets in a 
20-year period. Though inflation plays a role, the 
significance of this increase is evident when we 
compare it to other forms of public spending. Only 
Medicaid grew more during this period.
15
 While 
approximately 30 percent of states’ correctional 
population is locked up, prisons consume 88 percent 
of the budgets.
 16
 Thus, for over a quarter of century, 
America sent more people to prison in the face of 
falling crime rates, at greater cost. Only recently, in 
perhaps the last five years, has the tide begun to turn. 
 
Punishment and Politics 
In mid-2010, Missouri’s Sentencing Commission 
made headlines around the state with the release of a 
matrix that provides criminal court judges 
information regarding the relative costs of 
sentencing options. The matrix offers 
straightforward cost comparisons between prison 
and probation sentences.
17
 The media coverage and 
accompanying rhetoric suggested that judges were 
being encouraged to save money by unleashing 
dangerous offenders into the community. While a 
purely dollars-driven approach to justice is 
unsettling, the guidelines are considerably more 
sophisticated. Judges are also given risk prediction 
information based on an actuarial method of 
determining who is likely to re-offend, a practice 
that some prominent criminologists consider a 
promising means of reducing crime.
18
  Reactions 
from the criminal justice community have been 
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mixed, with some lawyers pointing out the merits of 
a risk-based decision tool, while others have decried 
it as an attempt to put a “price tag on justice.”
19
 Yet 
the reality is that criminal justice system resources 
are finite, and there are opportunity costs associated 
with every decision to confine a low-risk offender. 
Cost alone should not drive sentencing, but cost does 
still matter, both in the sense of good fiscal policy 
and public safety.  
Given their politically sensitive positions, judges and 
prosecutors who perceive that the public prefers 
tougher sentences may opt to ignore data suggesting 
that low-risk offenders could be safely supervised in 
the community. They also have power to adjust 
sentencing decisions downwards, despite guidelines 
created by sentencing commissions and legislative 
mandates.  
These kinds of guidelines have constrained 
discretion but have not been completely taken 
discretion out of the equation. For example, 
sentencing reforms introduced in the 1990s were 
designed to limit discretion, and increase the time 
certain offenders would spend behind bars. 
However, these laws did not consistently produce 
that effect. In some jurisdictions, judges and 
prosecutors simply altered practices (for instance, 
through plea bargaining) so as to reduce the number 
of offenders subject to these laws.
20
  Such 
adjustments are not inherently negative and 
represent an attempt to allocate correctional 
resources more efficiently or a response to 
perception that strict application of the law results in 
some unjust sentences. Presumably, too, these reflect 
recognition that individual-level factors may be 
more useful in determining an optimal sentence than 
the nature of the offense. The combination of 
discretionary practices and political pressures make 
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it difficult to make accurate predictions regarding 
how changing crime rates will influence corrections 
growth. 
Superficial analysis of these trends suggests this is a 
cause-and-effect relationship, and that the 
incarceration experiment succeeded and did in fact, 
deter. However, a state-by-state analysis carried out 
by the Sentencing Project shows it is not this simple. 
Between 1991 and 1998, those states that had a 
slower growth in incarceration saw greater declines 
in crime rates than states that had higher than 
average growth rates.
21
 From 1998 through 2004, 
twelve states whose imprisonment rates either held 
steady or declined experienced a crime rate decline 
equivalent to the national rate.
22
   
Perhaps the most important fact about sentencing 
and corrections that is overlooked by the American 
public concerns the transitory nature of 
incarceration. Missouri reports that, on average, 97 
percent of imprisoned offenders will return to 
society at some point.
23
 A review of release data 
nationwide from 1980-2002 revealed a community 
reentry rate of 95 percent.
24
 This is a sobering reality 
that seems lost on those who stubbornly cling to the 
belief that we can incarcerate our way out of the 
crime problem. Every corrections dollar is spent not 
to just to contain criminals, but rather to contain 
criminals who in all likelihood will re-enter society.  
Just how punishment affects recidivism is largely 
misunderstood by system outsiders. Support for 
spare and harsh conditions of confinement is 
concomitant with the “get tough” and “lock ’em and 
throw away the key” perspective. The notion that 
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tough punishment serves as a deterrent derives from 
rational choice theory, which holds that crime is 
controlled through fear of punishment. This is often 
confused with the idea that harsher punishments 
equate to less crime. In fact, Cesare Becarria, whose 
classical criminology theory was the forerunner for 
modern rational choice theory, did support 
uniformly harsh penalties, but rather that the 
punishment fit the crime. Excessive punishment, 
Becarria maintained, is unnecessary and inefficient.  
While there is evidence that some crime can be 
deterred with appropriate application of penalties, 
criminal behavior is far too complex a phenomenon 
to be encompassed with this single theory. The fact 
that brutal penalties do little to deter has long been 
accepted as conventional wisdom by criminologists 
and seasoned correctional practitioners. History 
abounds with examples of the failure of even the 
most horrific punishment to deter. The Ancient 
Romans bundled up parricidal offenders into a bag 
with a serpent, a dog, rooster, and primate and tossed 




 Despite seeing their 
countrymen come to this painful end, Romans 
continued to murder family members. Nor did other 
forms of torture and execution that were common to 
ancient societies, such as impalement, mutilation or 
the Athenians’ method of slowly roasting criminals 
inside a bronze bull (known as a “brazen bull”),
27
 
take an appreciable bite out of crime.  
Though more recent endeavors to scare offenders 
away from crime have also not proven effective, 
many Americans still embrace this idea. Such 
support can be evidenced in the popularity of the six-
term sheriff of Arizona’s Maricopa County, Joe 
Arpaio. Arpaio, who oversees the county’s jail, has 
been widely praised for his use of tents to house 
offenders in desert conditions exceeding 100 
degrees, distribution of pink underwear, and chain 
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gangs. Yet despite Arpaio’s campaign claims, these 
harsh conditions and attempts to demean offenders 
have not been shown to affect recidivism. A study 
comparing offenders released from the Maricopa 
County Jail under Arpaio’s administration with those 
released under the previous administration found no 
significant differences in the recidivism rates.
28
    
Public support for hard time is also reflected in the 
rise of super-max facilities, which house unruly 
offenders who fail to conform to rules at other 
prisons. Typically, offenders in these facilities are 
confined to their cells twenty-three hours a day. 
Examination of recidivism rates for these facilities 
offers further support that hard time does not deter 
criminal behavior. A study of inmates released form 
Washington state’s super-max facility found that 
those released directly from super-max confinement 
actually returned to prison at a faster rate than a 
comparable group that had served time in traditional 
facilities.
29
 When researchers examined recidivism 
of the comparison group and that of super-max 
offenders who were sent to a lower security facility 
after leaving super-max pre-release, they found that 
recidivism rates between the two groups did not 
differ. A Florida study reached similar conclusions. 
Inmates released from super-max confinement had 
higher rates of violent recidivism than did a 
comparable group of inmates who had served time at 
lower security facilities, though there was no 
relationship between timing of the super-max 
experience, release, and recidivism.
30
 Nor are 
offenders deterred by the experience of lengthy 
incarceration. In fact, a meta-analysis of studies that 
had tested the relationship between sentence length 
and recidivism revealed a small positive correlation. 
In other words, the longer the sentence, the higher 
the recidivism rate.
31
 A comprehensive review of the 
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research found that, in general, offender behavior is 
not deterred through use of harsh penalties.
32
 
But imprisonment has other goals. One could argue 
that the function our corrections system most 
effectively achieves is incapacitation. It is nearly 
impossible to refute that by removing offenders from 
the community we constrain their illegal activity, if 
only temporarily. If the period of incarceration 
corresponds to the peak years of adult criminal 
activity (late teens through late 20s), the impact on 
crime can be substantial. Empirical evidence does 
indicate that meaningful benefits accrue if we can 
contain the most prolific career criminals for 
relatively long periods of time.
33
 Economist Stephen 
Levitt examined how mandated caps on prison 
overcrowding affected the crime rate, and concluded 
that for every person incarcerated, there were 15 
fewer crimes.
34
 This finding would support prison 
expansion. Levitt has tempered these findings by 
noting it is primarily property crimes, not violent 
ones, that were averted.
35
 An estimated 25 percent 
drop in violent crime has been attributed to the 
1990s incarceration boom.
36
 While not the impact 
hoped for from sentencing reforms, when one 
considers the impact in raw numbers, 25 percent less 
violent crimes is meaningful. However, it is not clear 
that indiscriminately sentencing all violent offenders 
to lengthy sentences, which was the intent of truth-
in-sentencing (TIS) legislation, is a smart, cost-
efficient policy. 
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One problem with long mandatory is that we limit 
our ability to lock up the next generation of 
offenders who are at large in the community. 
37
 This 
returns us to the earlier point about opportunity 
costs. There is a tipping point at which resources are 
over-allocated into imprisonment, and we sacrifice 
opportunities to address the newly emerging 
generation of offenders. Under the TIS laws in many 
states, violent offenders must serve 85 percent of 
their sentence. Prisons are now home to a larger 
proportion of offenders who are past middle age 
(and well past their peak offending years) than has 
been the case in the past.
38
 This situation will clearly 
worsen over time. The Missouri Department of 
Corrections’ percentage of incarcerated offenders 
over the age of 50 doubled between 2000-2010.
39 
These older offenders require more costly medical 
services in an era in which medical costs are rising 
— in fact, it is estimated that elderly offenders’ 
healthcare costs are three times that of younger 
offenders.
40
 Many aging offenders are serving 
lengthy sentences for drug crimes, a consequence of 
America’s “war on drugs” that resulted in lengthier 
sentences. This crusade had its most profound 
impact on federal prison populations, although state 
prisons have been affected as well.  
In the two decades since the sentencing reforms 
were ushered in, we have seen both intended positive 
consequences and unintended impacts, including the 
cost of prison expansion. Imprisonment was among 
the factors augmenting the decline of crime in the 
late 20
th
 and early 21
st
 century, though processes 
beyond tough sentencing and expanded capacity also 
played an important role. Collectively, the evidence 
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points to the value of allocating prison space 
selectively. In order to advance this goal, states need 
to revisit legislation that requires lengthy mandatory 
sentences and consider mechanisms for releasing 
offenders previously sentenced under these laws. 
Indeed, many states have already have begun this 
process and have repealed mandatory sentencing 
statutes. Also, sentencing commissions should 
promote more consistent use of actuarial tools for 
determining which offenders present the greatest risk 
to re-offend. These should allow for more precise 
targeting than did the typical sentencing reforms of 
the late 1980s and ’90s, which were directed at 
broad categories of offense types.  
It would be remiss to discuss the functions of our 
corrections system without noting that for many 
Americans, sentencing is seen as a means for 
achieving retribution. None of the above discussion 
should be construed to diminish the right of citizens 
in a democratic society to demand retribution if that 
is what they deem important. Retribution is an 
abstract, emotionally-laden concept and does not fit 
neatly into a treatise on cost-efficiency and other 
pragmatic concerns. In this sense, justice is not about 
reducing future crime, and operates independently of 
deterrence. Justice is compromised if we structure 
sentences so that the risk of recidivism outweighs 
the nature of the act. Thus, the model of selective 
incapacitation should be applied not only to the 
group at high-risk for violent and chronic offending. 
It may also be used to achieve retribution for those 
cases in which the crimes are most egregious and 
damaging, regardless of risk propensity.  
Because states have begun backing away from 
mandatory sentencing laws, discretion has been 
returned to judges in recent years. If judges increase 
their reliance on statistically-derived risk assessment 
tools we can achieve a balance between excessive 
use of discretion and tight mandates.
41
 These 
assessment tools, like the aforementioned Missouri 
matrix, can be quite valuable in the sentencing 
process. Judges are not adverse to making risk-
driven decisions, and often make subjective risk 
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assessments which play a substantial role in how 
they sentence offenders. Yet such subjective 
assessments have found to be only modestly valid.
42
  
Repeatedly, actuarial risk tools have been found to 
have superior predictive ability to the subjective 





Maximizing long-term outcomes 
If we do begin investing a lesser share of public 
expenditures in our nation’s prison systems, we need 
to “reinvest” in measures that can successfully 
reduce crime. The body of literature that addresses 
“smart on crime” policies calls for a three-pronged 
approach: selective incapacitation of high-risk 
violent offenders, rehabilitation and reintegration of 
lower risk non-violent offenders, and primary 
prevention initiatives. 
The day-to-day of prison operations is largely out of 
public view, and as a result, taxpayers are not 
familiar with the needs of a typical prison 
community and the issues administrators face in 
managing budgets. The importance of daily prison 
life to rehabilitation and re-entry is misunderstood 
and under-appreciated by the public. Even if we 
endeavor to focus on incarcerating only the most 
violence-prone offenders, we cannot abandon the 
practice of operating prisons as full communities. 
The experience of incarceration and therefore how 
corrections dollars are allocated is critical to public 
safety. In recent decades, Americans have been 
supportive of correctional expenditures related to 
expansion but little else.  
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Media coverage on the costs of corrections tends to 
focus on two dimensions of corrections spending: 
the construction costs, and amenities such as 
exercise equipment and cable television. Yet 
corrections is far more than bricks and mortar. A 
functional prison requires the typical costs of any 
residential community, such as utilities, healthcare, 
food, and maintenance. Staffing needs go well 
beyond custodial positions (“guards,” more 
commonly referred to today as correctional officers), 
and includes food service, maintenance and clerical 
personnel, administrators, medical and mental health 
professionals, teachers, and staff trainers. Labor 
costs can be offset with the much cheaper inmate 
labor, but nevertheless, a typical 1,000 bed facility 
may have 200-300 paid employees.  
Furthermore, the perceived “frills” found in 
American prisons have minimal impact on budgets. 
The media accounts of these luxuries often infuriate 
the public and feed hyperbolic political rhetoric, 
which in turn fuels support for harsher conditions. 
Yet most of these costs are not borne by the 
taxpayer. In Missouri, for example, inmates pay a 
mark-up on items purchased in prison commissaries, 
and this overage is diverted into a fund from which 
inmates may purchase cable packages, or new 
weight machines.
44
  Those recreational and 
vocational activities that are supported by tax dollars 
are generally not costly and have little impact on the 
overall budget. When corrections budgets are cut, 
administrators cannot solve the problem simply by 
scaling back the amenities. Furthermore, long-term 
correctional employees realize the value in keeping 
inmates occupied and can leverage amenities to 
minimize disruptions. This results in a safer 
environment for staff and prisoners while 
minimizing opportunities for criminal activity.  
           If we expect to return offenders to society at 
lower risk, we would do well to cultivate 
correctional communities that offer opportunities for 
self-improvement and foster skills necessary for 
successful reintegration. Currently, there is a good 
deal of confusion among not just the general public, 
but even criminal justice practitioners, regarding the 
                                                 
44
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status of research on rehabilitation. In 1974, Robert 
Martinson published “What Works?”, a famous, oft-
quoted and often misrepresented meta-analysis of 
correctional rehabilitative effort.
45
 Martinson’s work 
cast a long shadow on the future of rehabilitation. 
The popular interpretation was “nothing works,” 
even though a number of weaknesses in his work 
have emerged over the years. For one, Martinson 
defined   “rehabilitation” over-broadly, and included 
studies of programs with very different structures, 
target clientele, and of widely varying intensity and 
duration. Many of the studies had no measure of 
“treatment integrity,” which concerns the duration 
and intensity of treatment programs, as well as the 
frequency with which offenders engage in the 
intervention. Offender participation in a 
rehabilitative program was operationalized in 
different ways in the studies he included. In some 
cases, participation meant some contact with 
program staff. In other words, in some cases, the 
offenders did not need to meet any criteria for 
program completion in order to be included in one of 
the studies in the analysis. In the years since “What 
Works?” was published, researchers challenged 
Martinson’s conclusions, reanalyzed his data and 
carried out further analysis of rehabilitative efforts. 
The efforts resulted in identification of many types 
of treatment interventions that do work, and that can 
significantly reduce re-offense and re-incarceration 
rates. This body of literature is perhaps best 
summarized in Paul Gendreau and Robert Ross’s 
survey of over 200 studies. They concluded: 
“Our reviews of the research literature 
demonstrated that successful rehabilitation of 
offenders had been accomplished, and 
continued to be accomplished quite well . . . 
reductions in recidivism, sometimes as 
substantial as 80 percent, had been achieved 
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While rehabilitative efforts occurring in prison 
settings had lower success rates than those in the 
community, these nevertheless have had positive 
impacts. Gendreau and Ross also noted that these 
results were not short-lived, as many studies had two 
years of follow-up, with some exceeding even this 
standard. 
Yet empirical evidence often takes a backseat to 
perceptions, and fear of crime translates into reduced 
support for rehabilitation. As fear builds, 
rehabilitative efforts are framed as sympathetic to 
offenders and anti-public safety, a political strategy 
popular after the Martinson study was published. 
Support for rehabilitation has never returned to pre-
Martinson levels. Certainly, the crime surge of the 
late 20
th
 century did not help matters. It is perhaps 
surprising, then, to find that rehabilitation efforts are 
underway in most of America’s prisons. Substance 
abuse treatment and vocational training/educational 
activities are most prevalent. Most facilities also 
offer facilitated self-help programs, and therapy 
directed at special groups of offenders. The intensity 
and quality of these efforts varies greatly, though. 
Many do not adequately match the criteria laid out in 
the literature that are critical in order to produce 
positive results. When these programs fail, they 
erode support even further.  
A full agenda for change, while ambitious, requires 
an investment in high-quality, rigorous, evidence-
based programs that carefully target offenders and 
match treatment to offender needs. Ideally, this 
involves replicating programs with proven track 
records. While limited grant funding is available to 
launch such programs, states need to commit to 
long-term funding to not only maintain treatment, 
but to periodically engage in outcome evaluations of 
these efforts. 
If we are to reap the benefits of rehabilitation that 
begins behind bars, we must continue strengthening 
practices for managing offenders post-release. In the 
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4:3 (1987): 349-407.  
long run, releasing offenders into society without a 
safety net only serves to maintain the status quo, 
with the tradeoff of high recidivism rates or costly 
incapacitation. And, as noted earlier, for most 
offenders, the crime reduction achieved by 
incapacitation is only temporary. Successful 
reintegration strategies hold promise for reducing 
future offending, which means not only cost benefits 
but even greater benefits in reduced victimization. 
Moreover, these strategies can realize cost savings 
through more efficient means for handling parole 
violations. Violations may signify offenders falling 
into criminal patterns again, but also may reflect 
inadequate support systems, lack of job skills, and 
other adjustment difficulties. With supervision and 
support, many of these offenders can remain safely 
in the community and not burden taxpayers.  
Community support for parole and reintegration 
programs has waxed and waned throughout 
corrections history. Public discomfort with parole in 
part comes from failure to recognize that in the vast 
majority of cases denial of parole delays release, but 
does not prevent it. In the vast majority of cases, 
offenders denied parole do not spend the rest of their 
lives behind bars. Media coverage regarding new 
crimes by paroled offenders often suggests that the 
crime would not have occurred had the offender not 
been paroled. While it is indisputable that any one 
particular crime that happens when an offender is on 
parole could have been avoided, delaying release 
may not decrease the overall likelihood that an 
offender will eventually return to crime.  
Yet, today, and in the past, measures that result in 
offenders serving less time are often misrepresented 
as liberal, naïve approaches to pamper criminals and 
reduce accountability. But those who have worked in 
the trenches of corrections historically have been 
among the staunchest supporters of minimizing use 
of imprisonment and more expansive and creative 
use of community supervision, and have long 
struggled to counter public perceptions. Indeed, 
some of the most revered figures in corrections 
history have championed early release. Lewis 
Lawes, the renowned  penologist  who helmed the 
New York state penitentiary, Sing Sing, from 1919-
1942 crusaded zealously for greater use of 






  In a piece for Harper’s 
Monthly Magazine written in 1938, Lawes refuted 
the then-popular view that supervised release 
coddles prisoners and argued strenuously for its 
value in promoting public safety.
48
 The situation 
Lawes encountered is quite similar to that nearly a 
full century later, with criminal justice scholars and 
system professionals advocating policy responses 
that are rejected by the public.  
An unexpected upside of budget shortfalls is a 
willingness to consider new directions, or expand 
into directions that may not be politically popular, 
but that can have positive fiscal impacts. In 2003, the 
Vera Institute and National Conference of State 
Legislatures convened a roundtable discussion with 
legislators from nine states to address the budget 
crisis they were facing. Among the practices that 
were reported to be underway were the repeal of 
mandatory minimum laws, adjusting release 
mechanisms to spur earlier release, and expanded 
use of diversionary programs, probation, and 
treatment for drug offenders.
49
 The discussion was 
tempered with the recognition that the public may 
not embrace such changes, and that politicians 
themselves had often played to public fear by 
promulgating the get-tough approaches. As Sen. Don 
Redfern (R-Iowa) noted:  
“We’re going to have to convince them that the 
kinds of things we’re doing are not going to 
jeopardize public safety, but make cost-effective 
sense — plus prepare someone, because most of our 
prisoners eventually get out.”
50
    
In the past decade, the Council of State Governments 
has been vigorously extolling the benefits of re-entry 
programs, cataloguing and evaluating state 
initiatives.
51
 The catchphrase “reinvestment in 
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justice” is gaining increasing popularity with the 
judiciary and correctional administrators, as well as 
elected officials. States are exploring crime 
reduction through use of evidence-based practices to 
strengthen community supervision, which includes 
providing access to services to assist offenders 
reentering the community. The array of services 
extends to securing stable housing, mental health 
and drug and alcohol treatment, job training and 
placement, and parenting classes. Collectively, these 
approaches are intended to aid offenders in 
establishing a stake in the community and building 
support systems.  
States are faced with the choice of trying to forge 
ahead under fiscal pressure or cutting programs to 
achieve short-term gains, and many are moving 
forward. In 2002, Missouri’s Department of 
Corrections (MDOC) began implementation of a 
massive initiative to reduce crime through more 
effectively transitioning offenders back into society. 
The Missouri Reentry Process is working to leverage 
costs through engaging other state agencies in the 
initiative, along with non-profit service providers, 
higher education institutions, churches, and other 
faith-based groups. Even Texas, legendary for its 
tough-on-crime stance, has bowed to pragmatism in 
recent years. The Lone Star State began exploring 
alternatives to long-term incarceration and refined its 
core mission. A pivotal point was when the 
legislature faced a projected $2 billion in 
construction costs over a five-year period if they 
were to keep up the pace of incarceration.
52
 In 2007, 
the state instead opted to sink $241 million on 
diversion sentencing and other treatment programs.  
Primary prevention falls outside the scope of 
corrections spending, but an argument can be made 
that in the long run, we can reduce the toll of crime 
if we invest in programs that start long before 
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criminal behavior emerges. The reward and cost 
savings, of course, will not be reaped for several 
years. Evidence-based practices include early 
interventions designed to produce changes in 
participants’ lives throughout their life spans. One 
example is Michigan’s famed High/Scope Perry 
Preschool Project, an intervention stunning in its 
simplicity. The program consisted of a high-quality 
preschool program for at-risk African-American 
children living in an impoverished community. 
Program staff offered 2.5 hours daily of educational 
activities and weekly home visits to encourage 
healthy development in participants for up to three 
years. In addition to myriad other social benefits, 
subjects randomly assigned to the project were 
significantly less likely to be arrested for violent, 
property and drug crimes from various life stages 
beginning in adolescence up to age 40. They were 
also less likely to spend time incarcerated, with 28 
percent of the preschool group and 52 percent of the 
controls being sentenced to jail or prison.
53
 Results 
of a cost-benefit analysis suggest savings of $68,584 
to the potential victims of crimes never committed, 
and $15,240 in savings from costs of dispensing 
justice.
54
 Other programs described in the “what 
works” literature take a similar approach in targeting 
established risk factors and helping those at-risk to 
develop protective factors and competencies to 
improve a range of life outcomes.  
Organizations representing front-line crime fighters 
increasingly are realizing the value of preventing 
crime in the early years. The International 
Association of Chiefs of Police, the National 
Sheriffs’ Association, and the National District 
Attorneys Association, have all put forth official 
resolutions supporting the efforts of Fight Crime: 
Invest in Kids. This national, non-profit group 
promotes awareness of the tremendous cost savings 
and public safety benefits that can be reaped through 
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enhanced investment in programs such as pre-
schools, after-school programs — in short, programs 
that can be implemented at relatively low cost to 
taxpayers yet have far-reaching impacts on 





Clearly, crime is a complex, multi-causal 
phenomenon to which there are no simple solutions, 
and no single method for reducing it. As stated in the 
introduction, the direction of corrections and the 
impact on state budgets is never easy to predict. 
Judging from how prison populations grew in the 
last part of the 20
th
 and early 21
st
 century, it is not 
likely that corrections costs will drop significantly in 
the near future. In fact, as the demographic shifts so 
that a larger percentage of the population is between 
the ages of 15-30, we may experience another crime 
surge in the next decade.  
The optimal balance of fiscal responsibility and 
public safety may best be achieved though (a) 
abolishing most mandatory sentences, and 
supporting legislation that allows states to release 
offenders committed under these laws who present 
as low-risk; (b) expanded use of empirically-
generated, risk-based sentencing tools to capture the 
benefits of selective incapacitation; and (c) 
investment in evidence-based practices in the areas 
of prevention, rehabilitation and re-entry. 
Our communities will to continue to struggle to dole 
out penalties in a manner that is both just and cost-
effective. At this juncture, the national trend towards 
“smart sentencing” and reinvestments in long-term 
gains can be seen as promising, though how long 
these efforts are sustained remains to be seen. 
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